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Abstract There are clear benefits associated with a particular consumer choice for
many current markets. For example, as we consider here, some products might carry
environmental or ‘green’ benefits. Some consumers might value these benefits while
others do not. However, as evidenced by myriad failed attempts of environmen-
tal products to maintain even a niche market, such benefits do not necessarily out-
weigh the extra purchasing cost. The question we pose is, how can such an initially
economically-disadvantaged green product evolve to hold the greater share of the
market? We present a simple mathematical model for the dynamics of product com-
petition in a heterogeneous consumer population. Our model preassigns a hierarchy
to the products, which designates the consumer choice when prices are comparable,
while prices are dynamically rescaled to reflect increasing returns to scale. Our ap-
proach allows us to model many scenarios of technology substitution and provides
a method for generalizing market forces. With this model, we begin to forecast irre-
versible trends associated with consumer dynamics as well as policies that could be
made to influence transitions.
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1 Introduction
The adoption of ‘green’ technology is hard to predict because it implies many inter-
twined social and economic factors plus retro-action loops. Because even a partial
description of these factors and their interaction seem intricate, authors are attracted
by the multi-agent modeling approach (see, e.g., Bousquet et al. 2001 and the related
special issue of JASSS). This multi-agent approach suffers from numerous limitations
when interpreting the impact of model parameters, and does not provide insight for
rigorous comparison between models and real systems. Moreover, model predictions
may abruptly change within very small regions of the parameter space (see also Weis-
buch 2000) and these dynamics are both easy to overlook and difficult to investigate
with agent-based models.
We here propose a simple, soluble model that addresses the intricate nature of
the market (heterogeneity in consumer responses, social influence, and increasing
returns to scale of production prices) and generalize various parameters that would
otherwise lead to unwieldy complexity in simulation (see also Kemp 1998 for a re-
lated model, but without increasing returns to scale). Our increasing returns to scale
includes both economic effects related to resources and supply, as well as social in-
fluences, i.e., increased demand that arises via peer pressure from those who already
own the product, which is an argument already made by Brian Arthur (1994). To
analyze the competition between goods with different prices and varied quality or
environmental features, we subsume the impact of different cultures, social influ-
ences, government policy, and advertising into a single curve, which we define as the
‘willingness to pay’ (WTP) function. WTP illuminates the consumer population dis-
tribution as a function of price and describes how people vary in the extent to which
they want to pay for environmental benefits. We assume that the normalized WTP
distribution has a fixed shape, while the price associated with each market product
varies with its market share.
Although the model turns out to have nice implications, this is not the only aim of
this paper. We also want to illustrate the KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid !!) approach
to complex systems. The KISS acronym is not much more than a popular version
of a much older principle in the philosophy of sciences that claims simple theories
are often preferable “because their empirical content is greater; and because they are
better testable” as Popper (1992, 128) put it. In this sense, our approach to transitions
is complementary to more conceptual as well as agent-based modeling approaches
that lack the strict focus on simplicity.
In our view, the more conceptual approaches (for some recent work as well as
many references to related older work, see Geels 2007; Geels and Schot 2007) are
very useful for obtaining a framework in which many transitions can be both de-
scribed and analyzed at a conceptual and descriptive level. In this framework, transi-
tions can be placed with real life complexity including aspects such as technologies,
impact factors, beliefs, social influence, economic factors, the role of political agen-
cies, etc. For Geels (2007), this approach enabled the detailed understanding of the
specific case of the Dutch Highway system. However, to have predictive power in
such a framework should also be falsifiable. In the general informal setup as it is built
up, e.g., by Geels and Schot (2007), we think every transition could be placed within
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the system and we see no possibilities to falsify it as a theory. Formalizing a complex
framework, as described above in an agent-based model, requires so many parameters
(see, e.g., Chiong, Meza, and Yãcel (2008) in this volume) that it is almost impossible
to obtain a comprehensive analysis of the complete parameter space.
In the KISS approach, we start from the other side. Although we realize that a sim-
ple model cannot cover all the complexity of every single case, we are not prepared to
add explicit complexity to the model as long as we do not have evidence that adding
explicit complexity via additional parameters could uncover new patterns in transi-
tions or enable the prediction of general trends. To connect our terminology with that
currently used in the transition literature, we begin with a simple utility maximizing
actors at the micro level and a very simple operationalization of the macro-level land-
scape allowing for only three different technologies to emerge into different mixtures
of diffusion (say, regimes). Clearly, this approach is closely related to Coleman’s
(1990, chapter 1) micro-macro scheme used for building social science theories. By
gradually adding complexity (see also Lindenberg 1992a), we gain insight to realistic
trends, and achieve qualitative or semi-quantitative predictions on characterization of
dynamical regimes and their transitions (see Sects. 3.2 and 3.3 of the present paper).
In this paper, we add two important elements of complexity to Coleman’s model,
namely, we provide actors that are not only interested in money but make decisions
based on environmental benefits and the actors that we employ are heterogeneous in
this respect. In addition, we do not just incorporate two competing technologies, but
three technologies. This enables us to formalize the complete system in terms of just
four crucial parameters and to investigate the full parameter space.
One additional advantage of this simple formalization in mathematical terms is
that some of the dynamics can be interpreted in terms of different processes in real
life; for instance:
• Positive return to scale can be interpreted either as a decrease in production cost or
an externality making more attractive a product bought by many people;
• A model with a WTP distribution as we develop below is equivalent to a proba-
bilistic model with a probability to buy depending upon the difference between the
actual price and WTP (see Nadal et al. 2005).
The formalization also enables robust inspection of our results with respect to
specific assumptions in the model. For example, as we will demonstrate below, the
fact that the same dynamical regimes is displayed in a large region of the parameter
space can be generalized to variations in the form of the functions used in the model,
in analogy with what physicists call universality. Both the functional form of the
return to scale function (provided that price is monotonically decreasing as a function
of the market share) and the WTP distribution (provided that it is single-peaked) can
be changed while maintaining the same dynamical regime.
In conclusion, the KISS approach manages the complexity of the real world and
our incomplete characterization of local processes to obtain robust predictions and
provide insight in the global consequences of local processes. We will now illustrate
this in our example of the competition between technologies with different environ-
mental benefits.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our computational model
with equations. Section 3 describes our results. We show that environmental technolo-
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gies will take over when a significant fraction of agents have already a WTP to pay for
the green car whatever its market share and when the increasing returns coefficient
is large (because of strong social effects or large production price reduction with
production level). We also demonstrate how different conditions can lead to car 0,
1, or 2 dominating the market depending on the rescaling of price due to demand.
Section 3.2 shows that our simple model not only provides reliable results but also
analytic tools to evaluate multiple asymptotic solutions. For some parameter values,
the dynamics have several attractors, which implies hysteresis effects. We extrapo-
late that the timing of the subsidies and grants at the immediate onset or emergence
of a new technology may be crucial as trends are sometimes irreversible. Section 4
summarizes our conclusions and shows future directions for this model.
2 A simple set of assumptions
We start the description of our model with explaining in detail our assumptions. We
use the example of more or less green cars below, but clearly any product for which
there is some non-monetary benefit related to the product can be used instead. So
where we write for convenience ‘car’ below, one could read ‘product,’ and when
we write environmental benefits or ‘greenness,’ one could read other non-monetary
benefits (amenities).
• Consumers care about two aspects of a car, i.e., the price and ‘greenness’ of the
car;
• Environmentally superior technologies are more expensive (given a similar market
share);
• Cars with a larger market share are cheaper;
• People vary in their extent to which they want to pay for environmental benefits,
i.e., heterogeneity of WTP (see Gordon et al. 2005, 2007; Nadal et al. 2005).
• People choose the alternative they prefer.
The second assumption is more for convenience than that it is really necessary.
Environmentally inferior technologies that are more expensive would not be chosen
by anybody, because given that there are two products with prices below what a con-
sumer is willing to pay, this consumer chooses the ‘greener’ technology. Thus, given
the first assumption, products that are more expensive and less ‘green’ cannot survive
in this market anyway.
The third assumption has two possible interpretations. A larger market share has
advantages of scale for the producers, which implies that cars can be produced for
a lower price when the market share is larger. From the buyers perspective, social
influence effects affect the utility consumers get from a product: a more popular car
is more attractive for most individuals than a car that nobody bought, which changes
the specific willingness to pay for that type of car. But this is equivalent to saying
that the price of that type of car decreases. Since only the difference between WTP
and prices is relevant to buyers’ decisions, both effects have the same results (Arthur
1994). In theory one should make a distinction between the production costs which
are influenced by market shares say during the actual year, and the social influence
380 G. Weisbuch et al.
Fig. 1 Distribution of willingness to pay (WTP) and market shares. Consumers with WTP larger than pi
may choose car i with market share ui equal to the shaded area
terms which takes into account how many cars of each type have been bought in the
past (the integrated yearly market share). In practice, because of the irreversibility
of the capital investment in the automobile industry, the actual production cost also
integrate investments and the two effects are driven by the integrated market share.
There are three technological options: standard (0), intermediate (1), ‘green’ (2).
• Each option i has its own maximum cost P0i , which equals the cost at a zero market
share;
• All options have the same linear returns to scale coefficient k (i.e., pi = P0i − kui ,
where pi and ui are the actual price and market share of product i, respectively);
• There is one distribution of WTP for environmental benefits (e.g., uniform or bell-
shaped)
It seems a rather strong assumption that all products experience a similar of linear
decreasing returns to scale. However, this assumption could very easily be relaxed in
future extensions of the model and is not crucial for the implications we derive in this
paper.
Figure 1 shows an arbitrary distribution of WTP. Consumers with WTP larger than
pi may choose car i with market share ui equal to the shaded area. More specifically,
consumers with WTP larger than p2 choose car 2. Of the remaining market share,
consumers with WTP larger than p1 choose car 1. Finally, from the still remaining
market share, consumers with WTP larger than p0 choose car 0. According to the
WTP distribution, some agents might decide to buy no car so that u0 + u1 + u2 ≤ 1.
In the following subsection, we explain how the stable market shares are com-
puted.
2.1 Equations
Given that we assume the same returns to scale, the price of a product follows a linear
return to scale function.
Heterogeneity and increasing returns 381
pi = P0i − kui (1)
Because of the influence of market share on actual prices, the order among actual
prices pi may differ from maximum prices at zero market share. A first operation is
to order products i. New indices j are used for prices ordered by increasing actual
prices, according to market share distribution. Some products might lose their rank:
in such a case, we consider that every time a product j has larger price pj than a
product with a better environmental quality, it disappears from the market: nobody is
interested to buy a more expensive product with a lower environmental quality. With
final indices j , equilibrium market shares obey:
uj = F(pj+1) − F(pj ) (2)
where F(p) is the cumulative WTP distribution. This simple set of equations is sol-
uble, either directly for simple expressions of F(p), as we do in Sect. 3.2 on results
or through transcendental equations.
While these equations provide the (possible multiple) solutions for the stable pro-
portions of each product in the market, one can also simulate the dynamics to these
solution by assuming that at each point in time a certain proportion λ of consumers is
choosing a new car according to the prices and preferences at that point in time. The
related dynamics of market shares is given by:
uj (t + 1) = (1 − λ)uj (t) + λ(F (pj+1, t) − F(pj , t)) (3)
The simulations in this paper were done for two simple WTP distributions: the
uniform distribution and a logit distribution. The corresponding equation for the cu-
mulative distribution F(p) is piecewise linear for the uniform distribution:
F(p) = p − pm
pM − pm (4)
between the minimum pm and the maximum pM WTP price. Below pm, F(p) = 0,
above pM , F(p) = 1.
For the bell-shaped cumulative distribution we use a logit expression:
F(p) = 1
1 + exp(−βp) (5)
where β is inversely proportional to the width of the distribution. If we define the




The corresponding graphs appear in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2 Distributions of
willingness to pay (WTP). A
uniform partial distribution
function (pdf) and the
corresponding cumulative
distribution function (cdf) are
drawn in black. The
corresponding logit distributions
are drawn in gray (bell-shaped
for the pdf, S-shaped for the cdf)
3 Results
3.1 Time evolution of market shares
The evolution of market shares for the three products is easily simulated for a fixed
set of parameters. The two plots of Fig. 3 only differ by the value of the maximum
price of the green product P02. In both cases, as in most simulations, only the standard
product is initially present (u0(t = 0) = 1, u1(0) = 0, u2(0) = 0). This corresponds
with the assumption that we want to predict at which maximum prices it is possible
to enter the market for greener products. In other words, we want to see under which
conditions green products that initially occupy a niche can become the main regime
and under which conditions this is less likely.
Asymptotic market shares are reached in a few characteristic times (λ)−1, where
(λ)−1 corresponds to a minimum characteristic time of evolution towards equilib-
rium.
The connection between the evolution of market shares and prices is evident from
Fig. 4, obtained for the same parameter values as the right plot of Fig. 3. The initial
increase of u1 and u2 decreases u0, p1, and p2, and increases p0. Since p1 decreases
slower than p2, u1 saturates after an initial increase and finally decreases. It is also
clear that due to the lower P02 in the right plot, the green car becomes the dominant
product in the market and completely drives out again the intermediate car, while the
standard car maintains a minority share in the market.
Because of the increase of p0, some consumers do not find any car to buy (unless
k is larger than the width of the distribution, see further Sect. 3.3). The asymptotic
sum of market shares is then less than one. Such a situation is often encountered.
3.2 Dynamical regimes
To obtain a more complete overview about how the parameters affect the outcomes of
the dynamics, we will now provide a more complete overview of possible end points
of the dynamics, the so-called ‘dynamical regimes.’ The parameters are a priori:
• Two parameters defining the center of the WTP distribution and its width (we only
study symmetric distributions).
• The three maximum prices P0i .
• The slope k of the increasing returns expression.
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Fig. 3 Time evolutions of market shares: standard (black), intermediate (dark gray), and green (light gray)
products. (λ)−1 = 10
Fig. 4 Time evolutions of
market shares and prices
They in fact reduce to four independent parameters, because only the relative po-
sition of prices with respect to the WTP distribution is important. We will find that
only the ratio of k to the width of the WTP distributions plays a role for simple dis-
tributions.
One should realize that λ is a kinetic parameter that only influences how fast at-
tractors are reached, but not the attractors themselves.
Figures 5 to 7 were made for constant maximum prices of standard and green
product, and for fixed WTP. We sometimes used uniform, and sometimes the logit
distribution. The two varying parameters are then k and P01. This turns out to provide
already a quite complete overview of which dynamical regimes occur and how they
depend on the parameters.
For the above choice of parameters, whether the green product becomes dominant
depends essentially from how far P02 is from the maximum WTP: in other words
what is the potential market share taking only into account the maximum price of the
green product. Of course, u2 increases with k. In fact, u2 is independent of P01 and
P00. At equilibrium it always obeys:
u2 = 1 − F(P02 − ku2) (7)
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Fig. 5 Asymptotic market
shares as of function of k and
P01. Uniform WTP distribution
[0,1], P00 = 0.5, P02 = 0.8. k
varies between 0 (no return to
scale) and 0.5. P01 varies
between P00 and P02. Light
gray stripes, dark gray dots, and
black lines correspond to the
market share of the green,
intermediate, and standard
products, respectively
Fig. 6 Asymptotic market
shares as of function of k and
P01. Uniform WTP distribution
[0,0.9]. All other items as in
Fig. 5
Fig. 7 Asymptotic market
shares as of function of k and
P01. Uniform WTP distribution
[0,1.1]. All other items as in the
Fig. 5
since the ‘green’ product is always chosen when the customer’s WTP is larger
than p2.
For the uniform WTP distribution this gives:
u2 = pM − P02
pM − pm − k (8)
where pM and pm are respectively the upper and lower bound of the WTP distribu-
tion. This expression is only valid for k < w (check Sect. 3.3 for the opposite case).
In addition, pM should be larger than P02 otherwise u2 = 0. It shows that the mar-
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The competition between the standard and intermediate car, on the other hand,
mostly depends upon P01: the standard car is favored when P01 is close to P02, and
the intermediate car when P01 is close to P00.
For the uniform WTP distribution, (2) in u2, u1, and u0 are easily solved; the
expressions for u2, u1, and u0 depend of the ranking of prices. In the case of p0 ≤
p1 ≤ p2, they are written in the simple case of a [0,1] WTP distribution:
u2 = 1 − P021 − k , (9)
u1 = p2 − P011 − k , (10)
u0 = p1 − P001 − k (11)
where actual prices p2 and p1 are obtained from the corresponding values of ui . One
sees from these equations that markets shares are zero (and the equations have to
be re-ordered) whenever pi+1 ≤ P0i . These conditions re-written in terms of initial
parameters are:
u1 = 0 iff P01 ≥ P02 − k1 − k , (12)
u0 = 0 iff either P00 ≥ P011 − k −
k(P02 − k)
(1 − k)2 and P01 <
P02 − k
1 − k , (13)
or
P00 ≥ P02 − k1 − k and P01 ≥
P02 − k
1 − k (14)
For more general distributions, e.g., the logit distribution, a similar iterative proce-
dure yields market shares and prices, but the equations are transcendental rather than
explicitly soluble.
3.3 Hysteresis
Equations such as (2) are well-known in physics, e.g., in the Mean Field theory of
ferromagnetism (Kittel and Kroemer 1980) and to some extent in economics (Föllmer
1974; Weisbuch et al. 2000), in the case of increasing returns or social influence.
They are known to produce ‘phase’ or ‘regime’ transitions when the number of their
solutions goes from one to three as a function of a parameter which is k/w in our
case (for the logit distribution w = 4/β).
Figure 8 allows to easily understand the regime transition. It is a graphical solution
of (2) rewritten as:
1 − u = F(p − ku). (15)
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Fig. 8 Graphical solution of (2)
rewritten as 1 − u = F(p − ku).
Abscissa is x = p − ku, and
ordinate 1 − u. The F(x) curve
(cdf), represented in gray for the
logit distribution of WTP and in
black for a uniform distribution,
intersects dotted black lines
1 − u in one or three points
according to the value of k for
the particular choice of p.
km ≤ 1 ≤ kM
The curves corresponding to the two sides of the equation are drawn in the plan (p −
ku,1 − u). The grey and black solid curves correspond to F(p − ku) (respectively,
logit and uniform distributions). The dotted lines correspond to the left hand side
1 − u as a function of p − ku; it is a straight line, which abscissa is p when u = 0
and p − k when u = 1. Two dotted lines are drawn corresponding to the two cases of
a large k, kM and a small k, km.
Three solutions may be obtained if the slope of the straight line 1−u is lower than
the largest slope of the F function. This slope is k/w for the uniform distribution and
4k/β for the logit distribution. The corresponding conditions for k versus the WTP
distribution parameters are thus written:




When k is above the threshold, one or three fixed points are then obtained de-
pending upon the value of the maximum price. In the case of three fixed points, the
central one is unstable but the two extreme are attractors; which attractor is actu-
ally reached depends upon initial conditions: large u values attractor is, e.g., obtained
when initially u(0) = 1 (and small u attractor when u(0) = 0). The central fixed point
separates the two attractor regions.
We considered until now P02 as a fixed parameter. Let us now discuss the effect of
variations of P02, which could be due to technological progress or to strategic moves
of the producer of car 2, or to government subsidies etc. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the
hysteresis cycle when P02 is varied, and the transition between the two regimes when
both k and P02 are varied. They were drawn by superimposing asymptotic simulation
results obtained when initial conditions were first u2(0) = 1 (black curves) and then
when u2(0) = 0 (gray curves). In the first case, we thus start without standard or
intermediate cars. In the second case, we start with only standard cars. For parameters
such that only one attractor exists, only the gray curves are visible. But when two are
possible, the black curves are visible and correspond to u2(0) = 1.
The vertical transitions obtained in the parameter space for the attractor at spe-
cific values of P02 still correspond to finite time dynamics with a characteristic time
of λ−1.
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Fig. 9 A hysteresis cycle
obtained for u2 when P02 is
varied. The black curve is u2 for
u2(0) = 1 and the gray curve
when u2(0) = 0. The increasing
returns coefficient k = 2 is larger
than the WTP distribution width
w = 4/β = 1. The two curves
coincide when the price P02 is
either small or large. They differ
in the intermediate price region
Fig. 10 Transition between the
hysteresis regime and the one
attractor regime when k = 4
β
.
The green dotted sheet is
obtained when u2(0) = 1 and
the black sheet when u2(0) = 0.
They differ only in the large k
and intermediate P02 region
The middle part of Fig. 9 can be interpreted as follows. If we have a market that
is completely dominated by green cars, the maximum price P02 has to rise almost
up to 1.3 before the market is taken over by the intermediate or standard car. On the
opposite, if the green car does not have a substantial share of the market, the price of
the green car has to drop almost to 0.7 before the green car can take over the market.
At the middle of hysteresis loop, P02 is one width above the center of the WTP
distribution. But since k = 2, the actual price when u2 = 1 is one width below the
center of the distribution. Large values of k imply a strong social influence with
respect to price differences: varying u2 between 0 and 1 scans a large percentage of
the WTP distribution (96 percent). At the transition, k = 4
β
= 1, this figure is already
63 percent.
We only discussed until now the dynamics of u2 as a function of k and P02. Which
of the two other products dominates or how they share the market when u2 = 0 de-
pends upon the actual values of P00 and P01.
Why should we care about hysteresis? After all, our starting assumption was that
the intermediate and the green options are introduced after the standard option im-
plying u0 = 1, u1 = u2 = 0 as initial conditions. Since there are several attractors in
this regime, the issue of the adoption regime is especially sensitive to the parameter
set-up: if we now consider that parameters can be under the influence of decision
makers such as producers or government agencies, or exogenous events (e.g., oil
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prices, technical advances), the hysteresis regime can bring huge consequences for
small parameter changes. For instance,
• If price P02 is lower under the action of producers, advertising in the media, or
government subsidies, a transition from the u2  0 attractor to the u2  1 attractor
can be induced.
• Such an action does not have to be permanent: it might suffice to bring u2 above
the separatrix, the central fixed point, to bring the system in the basin of attraction
of high u2.
• Competitors might also have equivalent strategies.
• Sharp transition can be induced in this region through advertising by decision mak-
ers, thus changing effective prices for some of the products or the complete WTP
distribution.
Multiple attractors are a challenge for scientists, but they are opportunities for de-
cision makers. Of course, parameter changes in the single attractor regime also influ-
ence the outcome of the dynamics, but their influence is far less dramatic. Moreover,
these effects are reversed as the parameter changes are undone, while the changes
under multiple attractors might remain after parameter changes are undone.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have illustrated, how one can obtain interpretable but already quite
complex dynamics from a simple model on the competition between more or less
green technologies assuming that consumers have heterogeneous preferences over
these goods. In the first part of the paper we have shown situations in which there
was only one attractor for the dynamics. These dynamics show that the prices of
the greener alternatives needs to be far enough from the boundary of the willingness
to pay distribution to take over the market, and that the advantages of scale should
be large enough to overcome price differences over time. Depending on the precise
parameters, several different regimes are possible, differing in the number of equilib-
rium technologies: 1, 2, or 3. In some situations, green technologies take over only
a smaller part of the market, while the standard technology remains dominant. But
there are also situations were first the intermediate technology conquers some of the
market, and thereafter the most green technology gains some market share and takes
most of the market.
Simulations were done with parameters being constant, by definition. One can also
infer the results of technological or attitude changes over market shares dynamics. In
situations in which there is basically only one attractor, temporary policy measure
will not have permanent results because the process will reverse as soon as the policy
measure ends.
In the second part of the results, we show that there are also situations in which
there are multiple attractors of the dynamics. They typically occur when the width
of the willingness to pay distribution is less than the increasing returns coefficient.
As long as the market share of the products is either very small (or very high) the
market is stable. However, if some agency is able to raise for some time the fraction
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of consumers using green cars, or if it could boost for some period the environmental
consciousness of enough consumers, the system might jump to the situation in which
most people drive in green cars. Such temporary policy measures could then have a
stable result even if the measure is only temporary. Of course producers of standard
cars could think of measures to get back to the first situation, but these would at least
be quite costly for them.
Let us stress that these dynamic properties are generic: they do not depend upon
a specific choice of the WTP distribution nor of the increasing return price function.
They apply to any S-shape WTP cumulative distribution and any monotonic increas-
ing return function.
Another way to test the robustness of a model is to study a probabilistic variant.
Would the observed dynamical behavior be conserved in the presence of a random
noise, a possible representation of other factors that we have not been able to take into
account in our model? In fact, Nadal et al. (2005) have discussed the role of noise in
buyers decisions. They have shown that a model with fixed WTP distribution, called
a frozen disorder by physicists is equivalent to a model with single valued WTP, but
where the decisions taken by the agents are probabilistic. In other words the agent
would choose between different choices with a probability function of the different




giving the probability of choice i among all other possible choices j .
The two models are mathematically equivalent and the market shares obey the
same equations, provided that the distributions are the same. We infer from this that
a model with both WTP and probability distributions corresponds to the same math-
ematical expression as in (2) with a distribution which is the convolution product of
the original distributions.
Many extensions of the present model are possible, some more application spe-
cific, others including coupling with pollution and opinion dynamics, the role of
government agencies etc. Some of these extensions might necessitate heavier sim-
ulation tools such as multi-agent systems. But anyway, the simple analysis that has
been performed here already allows to figure out the influence of the parameters on
the observed dynamical regimes and the level of behavioral complexity that can be
expected for the heterogeneity of agents and increasing return hypotheses.
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